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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the late 1990s the Jubilee 2000 campaign drew international public attention to the 
ongoing developing country debt crisis. In a worldwide campaign, which mobilised a 
petition of 24 million signatures, civil society organisations succeeded in placing the debt 
issue firmly on the international agenda. G7 leaders committed themselves to cancelling 
more than $110bn of the debt of the 42 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). World 
Bank and IMF officials scurried to get as many countries as possible onto the debt relief 
path by the dawn of the new millennium.  
 
Since the year 2000, however, momentum has waned, overoptimistic assumptions have 
minimised the relief on offer, and creditors have dragged their feet on funding. As a 
result the HIPC initiative is failing to offer meaningful relief to heavily indebted nations 
or to restore them to viability. To date, only 6 countries have received any substantial 
write-off of debt under the initiative; almost a third of eligible countries are yet to see any 
benefit at all fromHIPC. The majority of countries will not see sufficient debt relief at so-
called ‘Completion Point’ to bring down their debts to sustainable levels, even according 
to the HIPC criteria. Furthermore, in order to qualify for HIPC relief, countries are being 
forced to adopt IMF economic conditionalities – which have failed to generate growth 
and stability, largely because their implicit purpose is to facilitate the transfer of assets 
from debtors to creditors. By effectively prioritising the interests of international 
creditors over those of debtor nations, the architects of HIPC (who are also creditors) 
have failed to return countries to sustainability. For many, therefore, HIPC is a failure.  
 
The corollary of the widespread disillusionment with the HIPC initiative is that   
politicians, policy makers and campaigners are starting to call for a debt relief approach 
which focuses more keenly on human development – or, to be more specific, on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs.) For them, unproductive debt repayments are 
pernicious because they divert resources away from spending on the key areas needed to 
meet the MDGs – health, education, water and sanitation, rural development – and into 
the coffers of northern creditors. The evidence on the link between indebtedness and 
poor human development is clear – the poorest countries on earth, often with appalling 
human development indicators, are also those which are the most indebted. In other 
words, countries with the least to spare are those facing the heftiest debt service bill.  
 
Until recently, support for the ‘human development’ approach to debt sustainability was 
restricted to a narrow group of northern NGOs
1. But over the past year these calls have 
turned into a veritable drumbeat around the world. In the much vaunted ‘New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (NEPAD), launched in October 2001, African 
leaders argued that ‘the long term objective of NEPAD is to link debt relief with costed 
poverty reduction outcomes
2.’ The Monterrey Consensus, agreed at the UN Financing 
for Development Conference in March 2002, recommended that ‘future reviews of debt 
sustainability should also bear in mind the impact of debt relief on progress towards the 
achievement of the development goals contained in the Millennium Declaration.’ Calls 
have also come from creditor countries such as Ireland, larger developing countries 
within the Group of 24, and, of course, from HIPC Ministers themselves, who recently 
                                                 
1 For example: CAFOD ‘The Human Development Approach to Debt Sustainability Analysis for the 
World’s Poorest’ CAFOD Policy Paper; ‘Cancelling Debt to Promote Development’ Paper by Joseph 
Hanlon, Policy Advisor to the Jubilee 2000 Coalition; Eurodad: ‘Putting Poverty Reduction First: Why a 
poverty approach to debt sustainability must be adopted’ October 2001.  
2 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), October 2001, pp.37-38   3
issued a statement lamenting the fact that ‘there continues to be no systematic analysis of 
the contribution that HIPC relief is making to the Millennium Development Goals
3.’ 
 
The aim of this paper to is look more closely at the scale of the debt problem and its 
interaction with the Millennium Development Goals. How big is the debt problem, and 
does it really matter in terms of meeting the MDGs? What is already being done in terms 
of debt relief and is it enough? Can debt relief really make a difference? And if we did 
link debt relief to the MDGs, how would this actually work in practice?  Finally, what 
shape would an alternative framework for resolving debt crises take? These are all 
questions that the paper aims to address.  
 
2. HOW LARGE IS THE DEBT PROBLEM?  
 
While the debt crisis experienced by low income countries only became a popular 
campaigning issue in the North in the late 1990s, sovereign over-indebtedness is by no 
means a new phenomenon. Even the latest build up of unsustainable debts and the 
accompanying crisis has its origins in the early 1970s.  
 
As Chart 1 shows, in 1970, developing countries as a whole owed only $72.7bn to the 
rest of the world, or less than 10% of their collective GDP. By 2000, this figure had sky-
rocketed to $2,527.5bn, or 37% of GDP, a thirty-five fold increase. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
although a relatively minor debtor in absolute terms, owing roughly $206bn in 2000, is by 
far the biggest debtor in GDP terms. In 1970, Sub-Saharan Africa owed less than 12% of 
her income; by 1998, this figure was almost 75%, although by 2000 – once the effects of 
debt relief were starting to be felt – this figure had reduced slightly to 66%.  
 
In absolute terms, the largest debtor region is Latin America and the Caribbean, whose 
total debt in 2000 stood at $809bn, or a little under 40% of GDP. Although Latin 
America has been subject to a number of debt relief initiatives – discussed in more detail 
below – the debt crisis has by no means been solved in the region, as recent events in 
Argentina and Brazil can testify. By and large, however, Latin America has been excluded 
from the World Bank and IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative on the 
grounds that most of the countries in the region are perceived to be too ‘developed
4.’  
 
Some of the build-up of debts is, no doubt, accounted for by excessive and imprudent 
borrowing on the part of corrupt and irresponsible debtor governments. But this is not 
the only factor. As Raffer has pointed out, a major factor behind the debt build has been 
the growth of ‘phantom debts’; debts which increase exponentially because arrears and 
interest is added onto the unpaid value of the original debt. As he writes, ‘As anyone 
familiar with basic mathematics can verify, creditors unwilling to grant sufficient relief 
when necessary, increase irrecoverable debts. Claims keep growing on paper, further 
beyond the debtor’s economic capacity to repay. ‘Phantom debts’ come into being, 
existing only on paper, nevertheless compromising the debtor’s economic future and 
allowing creditors to exert pressure
5.’ In Nigeria, the largest debtor in Sub Saharan Africa, 
for example, 40% of the colossal $34bn of external debt can be attributed to the cost of 
the country falling into arrears.  
                                                 
3 HIPC Ministerial Network Press Release, 28th September 2002.  
4 Of all Latin American countries, only Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras are eligible for the HIPC 
initiative. 
5 Kunibert Raffer, Justice Before Generosity, Debt Update, December 1998, Jubilee 2000 Coalition .    4
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As Chart 2 shows, the vast majority of the debt is owed either by public institutions 
(governments or parastatals) or is effectively guaranteed by them. Although some of the 
original debt was taken on by private companies, once the crisis hit and these companies 
were no longer able to raise the required hard currency to service the debts, governments 
stepped in, sometimes even without having made any prior guarantee for the loan. In this 
way, debts were effectively ‘nationalised’  and the risk transferred to taxpayers.  
 
Private sector debt has started to rise again in the 1990s, particularly in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and East Asia. In both regions, private sector organisations now 
account for roughly 30% of the total external debt. While private sector debt does not, of 
course, create the same pressures on the public purse as government debt, it nevertheless 
can create exchange rate problems, as the 1997/8 crisis in East Asia demonstrated all too 
well.  
 
Chart 2: Growth of public and private debt in developing 
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While the debt build up has risen sharply since the 1970s, debt service has recently 
surged to new heights, both in absolute terms and in relation to exports and revenues. 
Chart 3 shows total debt service paid each year by each region:  
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As chart 3 shows, there was a substantial upsurge in debt service payments in the second 
half of the 1990s, although by 2000 this has started to reduce slightly as a result of the 
HIPC debt relief initiative. In 1990, developing countries as a whole were paying only 
$163.8bn, or 3.8% of their combined GDP, to their rich country creditors. By 2000, this 
figure had more than doubled, to $398.9bn, or more than 6% of GDP.  
 
This upsurge is partly related to the delayed effects of increased borrowing in the 1980s, 
particularly for longer term loans which did not have to be repaid immediately. However, 
part of the upsurge is simply the result of countries becoming better debtors. The World 
Bank’s figures show debt service on a paid, rather than a due basis. During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, many countries were effectively insolvent, and so were not paying the 
amounts due. In order to gain HIPC debt relief, countries have had to pay up, 
minimising the gains that, in practical terms, they should have accrued from HIPC.  
 
Debt service is also extremely high in relation to ODA flows, and this ratio has been 
growing throughout the 1990s. Table 1 shows debt service payments in relation to ODA 
in each region in 1995 and 2000: 
 
Table 1: Debt Service and ODA by Region, 1995 and 2000 
 










East Asia and Pacific   56.4  10.0  5.6  88.2  8.5  10.4 
Europe and C Asia  31.9 11.6  2.8  51.8  10.9  4.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean  70.1  6.3  11.0  144.3  5.0  28.9 
Middle East and North Africa   20.8  5.6  3.7  20.5  4.6  4.5 
South Asia   15.4  5.2 3.0  12.9  4.2  3.1   6
Sub-Saharan Africa   11.1  18.9  0.6  12.6  13.5  0.9 
Total   205.6  57.7  3.6  330.4  46.6  7.1 
 
 
As Table 1 shows, by 2000 developing countries as a whole were paying out 7 times 
more in debt service than they were receiving in aid; a sharp increase from the ratio of 
only 3.6  in 1995. This amount varied substantially by region, with Latin America and the 
Caribbean paying out almost 29 times more than they received in aid. Of course, this is 
partly due to Latin America’s  substantial volume of non-concessional flows which must 
be serviced. The inflows are not counted as ODA because they are not sufficiently 
concessional, while the outflows are still included in the debt service figures.   
Nevertheless, it is striking that for Sub-Saharan Africa, which does by and large receive 
concessional (ODA) flows, the ratio is still 0.9, up from 0.6 in 1995. In other words, 
Africa is paying back 90% of what it receives every year in aid, up from 60% in 1995.  
 
3. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF UN-PAYABLE DEBTS?  
 
“Debt, like AIDS, is a killer” was one of the central messages of the Jubilee 2000 
campaign. As the campaign made clear, debt repayments divert precious resources from 
governments which can ill afford to spare them. Governments that are paying up to half 
– and in some cases more – of their revenues in debt service have limited resources left 
for meeting the basic needs of their populations. Without spending money on basic 
services like clean water, sanitation and health, there is little hope of poor countries 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
Table 2 charts progress of HIPCs towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals. 
It shows each country within the various stages of the HIPC process: a) countries which 
are at ‘Completion Point’ (i.e. they have received full debt write-off promised under 
HIPC);    7
 
Table 2: HIPCs and Human Development  
 
Country   Target: 
Halve 
 
Target 2: Ensure that all 
children can complete 
primary education 
Target: eliminate gender 




Target: Halve the proportion of people without 
access to improved water sources 
  Undernourished 








grade 5 (%) 
Female gross 
enrolment as 




(% of male) 
Under five 
mortality rate 
(per 1000  live 
births) 
Population using improved water sources (%) 
Completion Point Countries           
Bolivia   Lagging           On track   On track  
Burkina Faso  On track   Far behind   Far behind    Far behind    
Mauritania   On track     Slipping 
Back  
On track   Far behind   Far behind   Far behind  
Mozambique  On track   Slipping 
Back  
  Far behind   Far behind  Far behind    
Tanzania  Slipping back   Far behind Far behind  On track   On track   Far behind  Far behind 
Uganda   Far behind       On track   Far behind   Lagging   Far behind  
Decision Point Countries              
Benin   On track   On track     Far behind  Far behind   Far behind    
Cameroon   On track           Slipping back   On track  
Chad  On track   Far behind Far behind  Far behind  Far behind  Far behind    
Ethiopia     Far behind   Slipping back  Slipping back   Far behind  Far behind  
The Gambia  On track       On track   On track   Far behind    
Ghana Achieved            Lagging    On track  
Guinea  On track   Far behind   On track   Far behind  On track   Far behind  
Guinea-Bissau           Far behind    
Guyana  On track   Slipping 
back 
On track   On track   Achieved   Far behind   On track  
Honduras  Far behind          On track   On track  
Madagascar  Slipping Back   Slipping 
back  
  On track   Achieved   Far behind   Far behind  
Malawi   On track       On track   On track   Lagging   Lagging  
Mali  Far behind   Far behind On track   On track   Slipping back   Far behind   On track    8
Country   Target: 
Halve 
 
Target 2: Ensure that all 
children can complete 
primary education 
Target: eliminate gender 




Target: Halve the proportion of people without 
access to improved water sources 
  Undernourished 








grade 5 (%) 
Female gross 
enrolment as 




(% of male) 
Under five 
mortality rate 
(per 1000  live 
births) 
Population using improved water sources (%) 
Nicaragua  Far behind   On track   Far behind  Achieved  Achieved   On track   On track  
Niger  Far Behind   Far 
Behind 
On track   Far behind  On track   Far behind   Far behind  
Rwanda  Slipping Back           Slipping back    
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
        Far behind    
Senegal   Far behind   On track   On track   On track   Far behind  Far behind  On track  
Sierra Leone  Lagging           Far behind    
Zambia  Far behind  Slipping 
back  
  On track     Slipping back   On track  
HIPCs Likely to reach Decision Point          
Burundi  Slipping Back      Far behind     Far behind    
Central African 
Republic  
Far behind           Far behind    
Cote D’Ivoire  On track   Far behind Far behind  Far behind   Far behind   Slipping Back   On track  
Comoros           On track   On track   Achieved  
Congo DR  Slipping Back           Far behind    
Congo Rep  Far behind       On track   Far behind   Far behind    
Myanmar  On track           Far behind  Far behind 
Togo   On track   On track     Far behind   Far behind  Far behind   Far behind  
Others             
Angola   On track           Slipping back    
Kenya   Far behind       Achieved   On track   Slipping back   Lagging  
Lao  Far behind   On track     On track   Far behind   On track   On track  
Liberia   Slipping Back           Far Behind    
Somalia   Slipping Back           Far Behind    
Sudan   On track       On track   On track   Far behind   On track  
Vietnam   On track      On track   On track   Lagging   Lagging    9
Country   Target: 
Halve 
 
Target 2: Ensure that all 
children can complete 
primary education 
Target: eliminate gender 




Target: Halve the proportion of people without 
access to improved water sources 
  Undernourished 








grade 5 (%) 
Female gross 
enrolment as 




(% of male) 
Under five 
mortality rate 
(per 1000  live 
births) 
Population using improved water sources (%) 
Yemen   Far behind           Far behind   Far behind  
Totals            
Achieved    1 0  0 2  3  0  1 
On  track    16 5  4 15  8  6  12 
Lagging    2 0  0 0  0  4  3 
Far behind   12  8  4  8  11  26  10 
Slipping  Back   7 4  1 1  2  6  0 
 
 
   10
b) countries which are at ‘Decision Point’ (when debt relief has been committed, and 
some interim debt service relief provided); c) countries which are likely to reach Decision 
Point; and countries unlikely to ever benefit from HIPC, either because their debt is 
already considered sustainable (Kenya, Angola, Vietnam, Yemen); because they are at war 
(Somalia; Liberia, Sudan); or because they have refused HIPC relief (Lao PDR.)  
 
The results are not encouraging. In every area except one (female gross enrolment as a % 
of male enrolment), fewer than half the HIPCs are on track to meet the target by 2015. 
Many HIPCs are not only off-track but are in fact slipping back from their 1990 levels. 
For example, at least 7 of the HIPCs are moving away from meeting the target of halving 
the proportion of people who are under-nourished; while 6 are slipping behind on 
reducing infant mortality. Table 2 shows that most of the HIPCs are ‘lagging’ or ‘far 
behind’ on most of the indicators.  
 
Of course, debt is not the only cause of poor human development. Other factors, such as 
low rates of economic growth, conflict and poor governance can cause both a build-up 
of unsustainable debts and poor human development. However, debt repayments are a 
major contributing factor to poor human development because they drain money away 
from government budgets. In 1999, for example, the HIPCs
6 spent one third of their tax 
revenues in servicing their debts. In some countries, such as Angola (84%), Cote 
D’Ivoire (62%), Guyana (48%) and Sierra Leone (50%), this ratio was much higher. Even 
by 2001, when some HIPC countries had started to receive debt relief, the 26 HIPCs that 
had passed decision were still paying 15% of their revenues in debt service. Box 1 looks 
at the case of Zambia and describes some of the appalling consequences of the high 
burden of debt service in that country.  
 
Moreover, the burden of debt service not only affects those countries officially classified 
as eligible for HIPC relief. For example, Bangladesh, (not included within the HIPC list 
because her debt burden is not considered sufficiently high) pays $790m per year in debt 
service, roughly what is spent on public health. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that 
Bangladesh is far behind in the target of halving hunger by 2015. In Pakistan, 63% of 
government revenues are spent on debt service, which may explain why she is so far 

















                                                 
6 Excluding Somalia, Liberia and Sudan, for which no data is available    11
 
 
Box 1: Debt and Famine in Zambia  
 
Zambia is one of the countries which, on current trends, is extremely unlikely to 
meet the overall goal of halving absolute poverty by 2015. In fact, poverty is 
worsening in Zambia; between 1996 and 2001, the proportion of the population 
living below the $1 a day poverty line rose from 69% to 86%. Zambia’s problems 
are  compounded by the famine which is raging across the country. According to 
Oxfam, 2.3 million people are currently facing chronic food shortages. 
Nutritional indicators are already extremely poor: 53% of children aged 3-59 
months are stunted, while 24% are underweight. Unsurprisingly, Zambia is also 
slipping back on the goal of reducing infant mortality – in other words, more and 
more children are dying.  
 
Zambia’s debt burden is adding to the problem. As ‘Jubilee Zambia’, the civil 
society organisation campaigning for debt relief in Zambia, write: we are ‘…not 
against paying back what was borrowed but (are) simply saying the country is 
unable to do so without denying its children food, school place, health care and 
other basic needs of life. Debt payments in Zambia like elsewhere take away 
money meant for developmental needs. This limits the opportunities for the 
nation to provide for its people and this in turn leaves people susceptible to the 
vagaries of nature. Zambia is like a country at war with tens of thousands of its 
people marginalized by the economic and social effects of poverty and 
deprivation of various forms and all linked to the external debt.’  
 
Chart 4 shows just how much is being spent on debt service in Zambia in relation
to social expenditures:  
 
Chart 4: Debt Service versus spending on 










































As the chart shows, the Zambian government is spending much more on debt 
service than on health, education or social welfare. Even by the year 2000, 
Zambia was spending $169m on debt service and only $100m on education.  
 
Sources:  Oxfam ‘Death on the Doorstep of the Summit’ Briefing Paper No. 29; Jubilee Zambia ‘Where Does the 
Money Go? Servicing Debt versus Servicing People.’ Chart from the Jubilee Zambia report; data originally from 
Bank of Zambia and staff estimates.  




4. RECENT DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVES  
 
The problem of sovereign over-indebtedness is not new. There were debt crises in the 
1930s, in the 1880s and in the 1840s. Debts have frequently been written off, reduced or 
rescheduled for political or humanitarian purposes. After World War II, for example, 
Germany owed a substantial volume of debts to the allied powers. In 1952, Hermann 
Josef Abs, an independent central banker, headed a team which negotiated substantial 
debt reductions with Germany’s creditors. According to Abs, if Germany had been 
forced to pay the debt repayments due, which amounted to 10% of exports, this would 
have been ‘intolerable.’ The allies agreed, and in February 1953 wrote-off more than two 
thirds of what they were owed. In 1953, Germany was to repay sums equivalent to 3.5% 
of exports; repayments were never expected to be more than 5% of exports.  
 
A similar deal was offered to Indonesia in 1971 when President Suharto succeeded 
President Sukarno. The same negotiator, Hermann Josef Abs, was sent to make a deal on 
debt reduction for the new government, considered to be a crucial cold-war ally despite 
the manifold evidence of shocking human rights abuses in the country. Abs noted that 
the IMF and World Bank had concluded that the debt service due each year – $200m – 
would exceed the country’s capacity to repay. The debt was rescheduled and Indonesia 
was given the opportunity to defer repayments for a further 8 years if the schedule 
proved too onerous
7. Had the debt relief initiatives of the past three decades been as 
generous, the debt crisis would almost certainly have been resolved long ago.  
 
Although the beginning of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ debt crisis dates back to Mexico’s 
default in 1982, concerns about the level of indebtedness amongst poor countries were in 
fact starting to surface as early as 1969.  
 
The Pearson Report of that year, which had been prepared on request of the then 
President of the World Bank, raised concerns about the debt problem and its origins. 
The report recommended that debtor countries be granted a ‘Bisque clause’, similar to 
that which had applied to a loan made by the US to the UK in 1945. This clause had 
allowed the debtor (the UK) to unilaterally waive or cancel interest payments. In 1957, it 
was changed to allow the UK to postpone up to 7 instalments, 4 of which had already 
been postponed by the time the Pearson Report was written. These payments were 
deferred to beyond 2001, with a 2% interest rate, and to date have never been 
repaid










                                                 
7 Source: Joseph Hanlon: ‘We’ve been here before: Debt, default and relief in the past – and how we are 
demanding that the poor pay more this time.’, Jubilee 2000 Coalition.  
8 Source: Raffer and Singer op cit.    13
 
 
In 1978, bilateral creditors adopted the Retroactive Terms Adjustment which 
cancelled some of the debt stemming from aid given by bilateral donors and also aimed 
to increase the net flow of resources to developing countries. According to Raffer and 
Singer, the clumsy and long winded name was evidence of the ‘creditors’ desire to avoid 
the words ‘debt relief’ or ‘debt cancellation’, not to mention ‘insolvency.’ This steadfast 
refusal to recognise realities officially has remained the most important hindrance to 
proper debt management and to a proper solution to the crisis until the present day
9.’ 
 
imilarly, the 1980s and 1990s saw successive agreements in the Paris Club to provide 
increasing levels of debt cancellation. The Paris Club, set up in 1956, acts as an informal 
group of creditor governments to agree on debt reductions for countries facing 
repayment difficulties. Paris Club members include official bilateral creditors, largely 
from industrialised countries. In 1991, John Major, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
proposed that creditor countries cancel half the debt owed to them by developing 
countries, rescheduling the remainder of the debt. This proposal would have generated 
relief of $18bn. He subsequently went even further and proposed 2/3 debt cancellation. 
Eventually in 1994 it was agreed that a 67% reduction could be accepted. In practice 
however this has only applied to “eligible debt” a limited proportion of the debt, defined 
by ‘cut-off’ dates and other criteria.  
 
1985 saw the advent of the Baker Plan, named after the then US Treasury Secretary 
James Baker. Baker’s main objective was to prevent outright default by the debtor 
through the provision of new loans. The main aim of the plan was to bail-out private 
sector creditors, and thus avert a financial crisis in the west. Banks were ‘encouraged’ to 
make new loans totalling $20bn, while the IMF and World Bank also provided greater 
levels of short term financing. However, the additional financing was extremely limited, 
and all the Baker Plan managed to achieve was to postpone the debt problem, rather 
than to solve it. Meanwhile, as already shown, the debts continued to mount
10.  
 
                                                 
9 Ibid, page 163-164.  
10 Source: Martin Debt and Bill Peters ‘The Crisis of Poverty and Debt in the Third World’ 1999. 
Box 2: Recent Debt Relief Initiatives 
 
•  1969 – Pearson Report  
•  1978 – Retroactive Terms Adjustment.  
•  1985 – Baker Plan  
•  1987 – Special Programme of Assistance for Africa.  
•  1988 – Paris Club: Toronto Terms 
•  1989 – Brady Plan  
•  1989 – IDA Debt Reduction Facility  
•  1990 – Paris Club, Houston Terms 
•  1991 – Paris Club, London (‘enhanced Toronto) terms 
•  1995 – Paris Club, Naples Terms 
•  1996 – HIPC Initiative  
•  1996 – Paris Club, Lyon Terms  
•  1999 – Enhanced HIPC Initiative  
•  1999 – Paris Club, Cologne Terms 
•  2001 – ‘Topping Up’ of HIPC at  
 
Source: Birdsall and Williamson (2002) ‘Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture;’ 
Raffer, K and Singer, H W (2001) ‘ The Economic North South Divide: Six Decades of Unequal Development’    14
In 1989, the World Bank instigated a Debt Reduction Facility (DRF) which provided 
loans to debtor countries to buy back their own debt on the secondary market at a 
discounted rate. For example, Guinea bought back $130m of its own debt from 
commercial banks for a total of $13.5m, financed partly through the Debt Reduction 
Facility. By end 1998, a total of 17 countries had taken part in such schemes, cancelling a 
total of $3.7bn in debt at a cost of $583m. The DRF was new in that it implicitly 
recognised the low real value of the debt; and that much of the debts of low-income 
countries could never be repaid. However, given that private creditors had effectively 
written down the value of the debts, the DRF amounted to little more than an 
accounting exercise. 
 
As a result a new scheme had to be launched in 1989 - the Brady Plan, named, as with 
the Baker Plan, after the US Treasury Secretary of the time. Brady noted that commercial 
banks had effectively written off a large chunk of the debts of developing countries in 
any case through reduced-price sales on the secondary market. Commercial banks could 
reduce the amounts owed by poor countries, partly by writing off some of the debt with 
the help from the World Bank and IMF, and partly by rescheduling a proportion of the 
remaining debt and converting it into bonds – the so-called ‘Brady Bonds’  - at a reduced 
price. However, as a whole the Brady Plan did little to reduce the debt burden. It simply 
decreased the burden of commercial debt – and thus the exposure of western banks – 
while increasing debts owed to multilateral institutions. From the point of view of the 
debtor country, multilateral debt was more burdensome than private sector debt as it 
could not be cancelled or rescheduled. Moreover, debtor countries faced hefty interest 
bills for the Brady Bonds.  
 
In general, the debt relief initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s largely failed because they 
were based on the following assumptions:  
 
•  That the debt problem was a liquidity problem rather than a solvency problem, to be 
resolved by rolling over old debts and providing new loans; 
•  That a crisis was resolved when western banks and thus the western financial system 
were placed beyond risk; and 
•  That multilateral debts could never be rescheduled.  
 
All of these assumptions proved to be either false or outright harmful. In particular, the 
reluctance of multilateral creditors to write off any of the funds owed to them precluded 
any effective resolution of the debt crisis in the poorest countries, particularly in Africa.  
Therefore, 1996 saw the development of a new initiative which focused in particular on 
the very poorest countries: the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  
 
Under the HIPC initiative, the IMF and the World Bank produced for the first time in 
their history a comprehensive debt relief initiative which accepted the cancellation of 
multilateral debts. It was seen as a ‘comprehensive’ solution to debt problems, because 
for the first time all classes of creditor were expected to participate.  
 
Debt cancellation under HIPC was designed to bring debt burdens down to levels which 
were considered ‘sustainable’; initially, a debt to export ratio of 200% - 250%; or a debt-
to-revenue ratio of below 280% if certain criteria (such as export to GDP and revenue to 
GDP ratios) were met. Under the initiative, all creditors agreed to provide their share of 
relief required to bring countries debt burden down to within those thresholds.    15
In reality, the initiative proved to be completely ineffective. Uganda and Bolivia received 
debt cancellation in April and September 1998 respectively – but within a year their debt 
burdens were once again deemed unsustainable. They had fallen victim to falling 
commodity prices which in turn exposed the over-optimistic forecasts made by World 
Bank and IMF staff.  Both the criteria for relief and the economic forecasts lacked 
intellectual rigour. To many observers, their purpose appeared to be to limit levels of  
relief for the debtor, and thereby reduce losses for creditors.  Mozambique, after 
treatment under HIPC, paid just 1% less in debt service than before HIPC. As a result 
no money was released for spending on health and education. 
By 1999, the shortcomings of the original HIPC initiative were evident and the Jubilee 
2000 campaign was gathering steam. Jubilee 2000, launched in 1996, had the stated aim 
of ‘cancelling the unpayable debts of the world’s poorest countries by the year 2000.’ By 
the time of the G7 summit in Cologne in the summer of 1999, the campaign had 
amassed millions of supporters worldwide. In Cologne, the world’s leaders were 
surrounded by 50,000 demonstrators and pressured by a million more who formed a 
‘Global Chain Reaction’ of massive international protest
11.  
 
As a result, the HIPC initiative was expanded and ‘HIPC II’ (or the ‘enhanced HIPC 
initiative’ ) was born. Total debt cancellation of $100bn was pledged, and the HIPC 
sustainability criteria were reduced to provide a ‘cushion’ for poor countries. Debts were 
now deemed to be unsustainable when they exceeded 150% of exports, in net present 
value terms. The debt-to-revenue criterion was introduced, so that for open countries 
with high levels of government revenues, debts were deemed unsustainable when they 
exceeded 250% of revenues in net present value terms. There was a new emphasis on 
poverty reduction, with countries required to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) in order to qualify for HIPC relief.  
 
Debt campaigners were still not satisfied, however, and pushed for even further debt 
cancellation, this time on a bilateral basis. US President Bill Clinton was the first to 
respond, announcing in September 1999 that the US would be writing off 100% of the 
debts owed to it by the HIPCs. In December 1999, Gordon Brown of the UK followed 
suit, and eventually peer pressure forced the other leading industrialised countries to 
make similar commitments. Eventually, all G7 countries plus a number of smaller 
industrialised nations agreed to cancel 100% of the debts owed to them by the HIPCs, 
either at Decision Point or Completion Point.  
 
However, evidence since the year 2000 does not suggest that the crisis of indebtedness 
for HIPCs has been resolved. In April 2002, the World Bank and IMF released two 
reports which confirmed NGO fears that the HIPC initiative was very far from achieving 
its stated goal of providing a ‘lasting exit’ from the unsustainable debt burdens of the 
poorest countries. The most recent report, released in September 2002, presented an 
even more gloomy picture, showing that:  
 
•  Of the 19 countries originally expected to reach ‘Completion Point’ under the 
initiative by the end of the year 2002, at least 11, or 60% would fail to do so. As of 
end-November 2002, only 6 countries have in fact reached Completion Point;  
 
                                                 
11 Source: ‘The world will never be the same again’ Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 2000.    16
•  At least 13 countries could no longer expect to have a sustainable level of debt even 
according to the HIPC criteria on reaching Completion Point; Uganda, which 
reached Completion Point in 2000, was already facing an unsustainable burden of 
debt; 
 
•  13 out of the 20 countries in the ‘interim’ period between Decision Point and 
Completion Point have at some point gone ‘off-track’ with their IMF Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programmes, thus delaying their debt relief 
and in some cases resulting in suspension of interim debt relief from the IMF and 
other creditors;  
 
•  Non-participating creditors were threatening to undermine the HIPC initiative by 
launching lawsuits against HIPCs to recover debt repayments that should have been 
reduced or cancelled by the initiative.  
 
In response to these charges, G8 leaders in June 2002 committed themselves to 
delivering an additional $1bn of debt relief in order to provide ‘topping up’ for HIPCs 
when they reach Completion Point if their debts no longer look sustainable as a result of 
lower-than-expected export revenues. In September 2002, they announced that the 
funding for this top-up had been fully agreed. However, since that time, no country has 
reached Completion Point meaning that there has been no test-case for the success of 
this proposal. Only Burkina Faso, which reached Completion Point in April 2002, has so 
far seen any topping up of relief.  
 
The major charge against the HIPC initiative, however, is not that it is failing to meet its 
stated aims, but that its stated aims are simply not ambitious enough. As Jeffrey Sachs 
wrote in the Financial Times on 24
th July 2001, ‘rather than looking at how much debt 
relief countries really need if they are to fight disease and give even a basic education to 
their children, G7 summiteers in Cologne arbitrarily defined a ‘sustainable’ level of debt 
as equal to 150% of exports…An approach based on evidence would start with the 
needs of poverty reduction and fashion debt relief to help meet those needs.’ 
12 
 
5. DEBT RELIEF AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  
 
The manifold failings of the HIPC initiative have led to an increased pressure for a new 
approach to debt relief – one that is based on human development needs as specified in 
the Millennium Development Goals. The basis of this approach is as follows:  
 
•  The Millennium Development Goals are a set of internationally agreed targets that all 
countries have committed themselves to. Rich countries should therefore do 
whatever they can to ensure that the MDGs are met;  
 
•  Poor countries prepared to commit resources to meeting the basic needs and 
economic rights of their populations should not be prevented from doing so because 
of the need to pay back debts to rich creditor countries and institutions;  
 
•  Debt relief required should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, ideally by an 
independent arbitration panel with nominees from both debtor and creditor 
                                                 
12 Cited in ‘Putting Poverty Reduction First’ by Eurodad, op cit.    17
countries. The panel should consider, amongst other factors (for example, the 
circumstances in which the debt was contracted): 
 
o  How much the country will need to spend on a yearly basis to meet the 
MDGs. Such analysis should ideally be done with the assistance of 
international organisations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and the World Health Organisation;  
 
o  The level of resources available to a country in terms of tax revenues and 
aid and the other spending requirements faced by the government;  
 
o  How much debt cancellation will be required in order to leave the debtor 
with sufficient resources to meet the MDGs; 
 
•  Debtor governments should only be granted debt relief if they can clearly 
demonstrate that the resources saved will be channelled towards meeting the MDGs. 
This process should be monitored by, amongst others, local civil society 
organisations.  
How the money is being used 
Some have argued that debt relief will do little to help countries meet the MDGs on the 
grounds that the money saved will not be spent on the key areas needed to reduce 
poverty, or that it will simply result in increased military expenditure.  
In order to examine whether or not debt relief resources are being used to meet the 
MDGs, in a recent report
13 we looked at data on spending on health, education and the 
military in 10 African countries, all of which had reached ‘Decision Point’ under HIPC 
by the end of the year 2000 (Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Gambia; Guinea-Bissau; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritania; Niger; Rwanda; and Uganda). The list was determined 
by data availability. Our conclusions were by their nature tentative, due to the problems 
in tracking budgetary expenditures in African countries. Furthermore, looking at 
spending on a sectoral level does not necessarily prove that spending on, for example, 
education, is genuinely going to benefit the poor rather than being spent on, say, elite 
universities.  
Nevertheless, our preliminary results found some extremely positive trends:  
•  In 1998, education spending in the 10 countries was only $929m, less than the 
amount spent on debt service. Today, it is $1,306m – more than twice what is being 
spent on debt service; 
•  In 1998, debt service took up twice as much, in terms of resources, as spending on 
health. Since then, spending on health has risen by 70% and is now one third higher 
than debt repayments;  
•  There is no evidence to suggest that debt relief is being used to fuel military 
expenditures. In the countries reviewed, we found no increase in military spending 
over the period.  
                                                 
13 ‘Relief Works: African proposals for debt cancellation – and why debt relief works.’ Jubilee Research at 
NEF, August 2002    18
Our findings are shown in Chart 5:   
 


















Of course, simply spending money in a particular area does not necessarily mean better 
outcomes in terms of human development. However, recent work by IMF economist 
Paulo Silva Lopes does suggest that spending on social sectors can have a positive 
impact. In his paper, Lopes used historical data to compare trends in social indicators in 
Sub-Saharan Africa with trends in government spending. He found a positive correlation 
between spending on social sectors on a per capita basis, in dollar terms, and 
improvements in social outcomes
14. 
Demonstrating that funds are being used effectively 
Some debtor countries have developed concrete mechanisms to show that the resource 
savings from debt relief are really being used to fund spending on human development. 
Box 3, for example, looks at the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in Uganda, which is often 
held up as a model case for other countries to follow.  
Although Uganda is the country with the most advanced poverty action fund, it is not 
the only country to use such a mechanism. In Tanzania, for example, a similar 
Multilateral Debt Fund, through which debt service savings are channelled to social 
expenditures, was established in July 1998. However, according to research by Eurodad
15, 
Tanzania’s fund has not been as successful as that used by Uganda. This is because the 
links between debt relief and poverty reduction were weaker in Tanzania than in Uganda. 
Moreover, the Tanzanian government, through the use of the fund, did not succeed in 
creating mechanisms to integrate debt relief into a broader strategy to reduce poverty. 
The public profile of the multilateral debt fund has also not been as high in Tanzania as 
in Uganda.  
                                                 
14 Lopes, P S (2002) ‘A Comparative Analysis of Government Social Spending Indicators and Their 
Correlation with Social Outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa.’ IMF Working Paper WP/02/176 
15 Eurodad: Eurodad Debt and HIPC Initiative Update, Spring Meetings 2001   19
 
 




Box 3: Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF) 
 
Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund was set up in 1998 to demonstrate that the resources 
saved from debt repayments were being used to fund poverty reducing expenditures. 
Despite its name, the PAF is not a separate fund but rather a ring-fenced subsection 
of the budget. Areas to be included in the PAF are determined by a group consisting 
of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, line ministries, donors and civil society. Currently, PAF areas include 
primary education, primary health care, rural water and sanitation, implementation of 
the land act, agricultural extension and rural roads.  
 
PAF resources include savings from debt relief, but also bilateral contributions from 
donors such as DFID and SIDA and a contribution from the Government of 
Uganda (GoU.) GoU contributions are determined by various rules designed to 
demonstrate that the expenditures financed by debt relief are truly ‘additional’ to what 
would have been spent anyway. The Government is required to put an increasing 
amount of money into the PAF year-on-year, and also to ensure that the PAF as a 
share of the total government budget does not fall over time. In the latter case, the 
GoU is certainly succeeding. Before the PAF was set up, in 1997/8, expenditures on 
PAF areas only amounted to some 18% of the budget. Now, the PAF constitutes 
around 36% of the budget. 
 
The PAF is monitored on a regular basis through joint meetings involving the GoU, 
donors and civil society. Concrete outcomes from PAF expenditures such as the 
number of classrooms or boreholes constructed are made available. In order to 
ensure proper accountability, 5% of all PAF resources are devoted to monitoring and 
accountability of PAF programmes and PAF areas are subject to particularly rigorous 
reporting requirements, especially at district level.  
 
As well as ensuring that debt relief savings are properly used, the PAF has brought 
about a number of other benefits. Firstly, it has encouraged donors to shift away 
from traditional project funding, which has very high transactions costs, and towards 
budget support. By putting budget support resources into the PAF, donors are able 
to be sure that their funds are being used for poverty focused areas, rather than, say, 
Defence or State House, while still giving the GoU flexibility in the use of those 
resources and lowering transaction costs. The PAF has also served to highlight to key 
constituencies both within and outside the GoU that government spending can have 
an impact on poverty. Finally, the PAF is to a certain extent being used as a test case 
for other areas of the budget. Eventually, it is hoped that the more stringent 
monitoring mechanisms which apply for PAF resources can be extended to the rest 
of the budget.  
  
However, the PAF is not without its costs. In particular, it has sometimes served to 
over-emphasise spending on directly poverty reducing areas on the expense of other 
areas – such as referral hospitals – which may be just as vital in the long run. In 
recent years, the GoU has also tended to over-allocate resources to the PAF in order 
to meet the agreed criteria even though the absorption capacity has not always been 
sufficient, particularly in terms of recruitment of frontline staff.    21
The Tanzanian and Ugandan cases suggest the following implications for other countries 
seeking to demonstrate ‘debt-for-human development’ swaps: 
 
•  There can be no one ‘model’ for countries to follow. The contrasting experiences of 
Tanzania and Uganda suggest that initiatives will work better when they are ‘home-
grown’ and have substantial political commitment;  
 
•  Debt relief funds should be integrated into the government budget, rather than run 
as separate funds. Even Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund has relatively high transaction 
costs in terms of tracking and monitoring PAF expenditures separately from the rest 
of the budget. Running a separate fund would worsen this phenomenon and create a 
further burden of work for planning and budgeting staff; 
 
•  Integrating debt relief funds into the general budget can also have positive spin-offs 
into other areas of planning and budgeting, as the experience of Uganda has shown. 
By improving accountability and transparency in one area of the budget, these funds 
can create incentives for ‘best practice’ to be expanded across the whole budget; 
 
•  It is vitally important that civil society organisations are fully involved in both the 
planning and budgeting and monitoring of resources saved from debt relief. 
Although in many countries civil society organisations lack the required skills and 
know-how to do this, such skills can develop over time as the incentives for carrying 
out this kind of monitoring become clearer.  
 
6. POLICY MESSAGE: HOW MUCH DEBT CANCELLATION IS NEEDED?  
 
Calculating the resources needed to meet the MDGs on a country-by-country basis is no 
easy task. Data on the number of poor people in each country, the current level of 
indicators such as HIV and malarial prevalence, or even the number of children in 
school, are often not available, or not reliable. Working out the exact amount that will 
need to be spent across different countries to meet common objectives requires making 
heroic assumptions about costs in each country. Moreover, some of the goals will 
interact with each other; if Goal 1 is met, for example, it is very likely that the additional 
growth and higher standard of living of the population which follows from this will bring 
about improvements in health and education outcomes.  
 
For this reason, any attempt to assess the amount of debt cancellation required to meet 
the MDGs must inherently seek to provide very general figures, or an ‘order of 
magnitude.’ More detailed work at the country level will be needed to assess the precise 
requirements for the MDGs.   
 
In an earlier report: ‘The Unbreakable Link – Debt Relief and the Millennium 
Development Goals’, we used country specific estimates prepared by key international 
organisations such as the World Bank, UNICEF, the World Health Organisation and 
Water Vision 21 to try to develop some indication of the debt cancellation needed to 
meet the MDGs. We tentatively demonstrated that if poor country governments are to 
have sufficient resources to meet the MDGs, as well as to meet other essential 
expenditure needs and pro-poor investments, the 42 HIPC countries as a whole 
cannot afford to make any debt service payments. In fact, we find that even if all 
the debts of these 42 countries are cancelled, the HIPCs will need between   22
$16.5bn and $30.6bn in additional aid each year if there is any hope of meeting the 
MDGs.  
 
These figures are based on actual debt service payments for 1999 – before most of the 
HIPCs had received any substantial debt service relief from the HIPC initiative. But as 
Nancy Birdsall and others at the Centre for Global Development have pointed out, even 
when all 42 countries have fully passed through the HIPC initiative, the savings will only 
amount to a paltry $3.5bn per year
16. It is clear that much deeper, and faster, debt relief 
must be provided. 
 
The additional amount needed to help the HIPCs meet the MDGs may be small in 
global terms. But as Table 3 shows, it represents 18% of GDP for the 42 HIPCs as a 
whole, and a staggering 355% of their debt service. Graph 1 shows the breakdown of 
this total by country.  
 
Table 3: Breakdown of Funds required to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals 
 











1  Eradicating mass poverty   45.7bn  27.2%  514% 
2  Achieving Universal Primary 
Education 
6.5bn 3.8%  72.8% 




Not known  Not known 
4  Reduce Child Mortality 
5  Improve Maternal Health 
6  Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and 
other diseases  
20.03bn 11.9%  225% 
7 Ensure  Environmental 
Sustainability: 
•  Reverse the loss of 
environmental resources 
•  Halve the Proportion of 
people without access to safe 
drinking water 
•  Improve the lives of at least 



























 Total  (Goal  1)  $45.7bn  27.2%  514% 
  Total (Excluding Goal 1)  $30.6bn  18.1%  355% 
 
In the next section, we provide an overview of the methodology used to calculate the 




                                                 
16 Source: ‘Gold for Debt: From Debt Relief to a New Development Architecture’ by Nancy Birdsall and 
John Williamson, with Brian Deese.   23
 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
 
•  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than one dollar a day 
•  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger.  
 
Eradicating mass poverty – defined as those living below the international poverty line of 
$1 a day - is often seen as the most fundamental of the MDGs. The $1-a-day poverty line 
is quite a problematic measurement tool, not least because people’s well-being, or ill-
being, depends on much broader factors than absolute income. Moreover, using an 
absolute international poverty line does not reflect differences in relative poverty across 
countries. While it represents gross numbers, or incidence, of those who are counted as 
poor, it says nothing about the depth of poverty or the inequalities amongst the poor, or 
between the poor and rich. But, as DFID argue, the $1 target ‘represents an 
internationally agreed operational method of identifying the number of people who by 
any standards have unacceptably low incomes
17.’ 
 
Of all the MDGs, this goal is also the most difficult to relate to debt service payments. It 
is clear that debt repayments are taking resources that could be spent to reduce poverty, 
but quantifying the exact linkages is much more difficult.  
 
In Box 4, we provide an econometric assessment based on the standard econometric 
models which have been used by mainstream economists to calculate the resource 
requirements for poverty reduction
18. The figures in Box 4 should not be taken too 
seriously – they rest on a number of questionable economic assumptions, particularly 
concerning the relationship between growth and poverty, and investment and growth. In 
particular, the results assume no role for redistribution within countries in order to 
reduce poverty. Morever,  there is also potential double counting between this goal and 
the other MDGs. Economic growth is likely to automatically increase education and 
health spending as governments have more resources available from taxes. A better 
educated population will also, other things being equal, result in higher economic growth.  
For this reason, we show the overall estimate of the costs of meeting Goal 1 separately 
from the cost estimates of meeting the other goals.  
 
Our overall point, however, is simply that by using standard and widely accepted 
economic models, we can show that in a world of finite development resources, debt 







                                                 
17 DFID: Halving world poverty by 2015: economic growth, equity and security  
18 The sources referred to in the Text Box are L. Hanmer, N.D. Jong, R Kurian and J Mooij (1999) ‘Are 
the DAC targets achievable?: Poverty and human development in the year 2015’, Journal of International 
Development 11, no.4 pp 547-63; Ricardo Gottschalk (2000) ‘Growth and Poverty Reduction in 
Developing Countries: How much external financing will be needed in the new century?’ and UNCTAD 
(2000) ‘Capital Flows and Growth in Africa.’ 
Box 4: The Economists’ Approach – Debt, Poverty and Growth 
 
In development circles, it is widely accepted that, in order to reduce poverty, you need economic 
growth. And in order to grow, you need to invest. Logically, money that is spent on debt 
repayments cannot be spent on investment, and thus reduces poor countries’ ability to grow.  
 
However, there is substantial uncertainty around the links between poverty and growth, and 
growth and investment. It is clear that growth does not necessarily reduce poverty, nor does 
investment necessarily promote growth. However, in this paper we have followed the methods put 
forward by mainstream economists such as those at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
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Using these ratios, we can calculate the required level of investment in each region to reach the 
target growth rate. According to Gottschalk’s calculations, investment would have to be 49% 
of GDP in Africa, 48% in Latin America and the Caribbean; 19% in East Asia; and 33% in the 
Middle East and North Africa to meet the target growth rates. 
 
Clearly, some of the investment required can be financed from domestic sources. For each 
country within the group of 42 HIPCs, therefore, we looked at the current level of savings 
relative to GDP, taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The difference 
between the current savings, and the required investment, is the ‘savings gap.’ This is the gap 
that needs to be filled by external financing. 
 
Some of the external financing can, of course, come from private external capital flows. Private 
external financing can include workers remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
portfolio flows – i.e. purchase of domestic stocks and shares by foreign investors. We are 
assuming that all of these are outside the control of the individual poor country, and that they 
will grow broadly in line with world GDP.  
 
So, each country has an ‘official financing gap’ based on the level of investment they will need 
in order to grow to reduce poverty, minus what they can expect to save domestically, and the 
private transfers they can expect from overseas. The remainder will have to be met through 
official transfers from overseas, either through grants or loans.  
 
This is where the debt comes in. We assume that debt repayments should only be made if there 
are sufficient available resources left after the funding requirements of the MDGs have been 
met. So, we can calculate, for each of the HIPCs, how much is available for debt service. This 
is defined as their official financing gap, less what they are currently receiving in grants and new 
loans. For purposes of illustration, we use 2000 data (projecting increases in grants and loans 
from 1999), to show the impact of the initial growth rates on requirements.  
 
Appendix Table 1 shows the results for each of the HIPC countries. In sum, it shows that: 
 
•  In total, the HIPC countries will need a total of $46bn per year if they are to meet 
the required growth targets. This is even without any debt service payments.  
 
•  Individually, almost every HIPC will need additional resources, and be unable to make any 
debt service payments, to meet the targets. The only HIPCs for which this is not the case 
are Angola, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Yemen. However, in most cases this is probably 
because of problems with the data. For example, according to the World Development 
Indicators, Angola has a savings rate of 32%, which seems a little improbable. In the case 
of the Asian HIPCs, the growth rates which will be required to meet the poverty reduction 
targets are probably under-estimated, because they are based on regional averages – as the 
HIPCs are amongst the poorest in the region, the rate at which they will need to grow will 
be accordingly higher.  
 
•  Most of the other countries require substantial increases in external official financing, due 
to the high levels of investment needed. In particular, some of the larger HIPCs, such as 
Sudan and Tanzania will require external financing of more than $4bn, over and above 
what is currently received. 
 
These figures may seem extremely high in relation to current aid flows. But the results are in 
fact comparable with other work by UNCTAD, which has estimated that investment to GDP 
ratios will have to be as high as 40% in Sub Saharan Africa if growth targets are to be met.    26
Goal 2: Achieving Universal Primary Education 
 
•  Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling 
 
Access to primary education is a basic human right. Education benefits individuals, their 
families, and also society as a whole, by enabling greater participation in democratic 
processes. Education serves to empower individuals, helps them to take advantage of 
economic opportunities, and improves their health and that of their family. 
 
Yet, in 2000, one in three children across the developing world did not complete the 5 
years of basic education which UNICEF believe is the minimum required to achieve 
basic literacy
19. We are clearly a long way from achieving the Millennium Development 
Goal of achieving Universal Primary Education by 2015.  
 
UNICEF have calculated the amount that countries will need to spend in order to meet 
the MDGs
20. They found that almost of all the HIPCs will need to increase spending on 
education – with larger countries such as Ethiopia needing to spend an extra $203m, and 
the poorer HIPCs such as Burkina Faso and Niger needing an extra $60m. We added 
these estimates to current level of spending on education, taken from the World 
Development Indicators 2001
21. From this, we were able to calculate the total spending 
that would be required in each of the HIPCs each year if the MDGs are to be met.  
 
Our calculations showed that the HIPC countries will only need to spend $6.5bn each 
year in order to ensure that every child gets an education sufficient to ensure basic 
literacy. While large relative to the incomes of HIPCs, on a global scale this figure is 
miniscule – representing, for example, less than half of one percent of the projected US 
defence budget of $1,600bn over the next five years. And only $1.2bn of this is 
additional to what governments are currently spending . 
 
Goal 4: Reducing Child Mortality 
•  Reduce, by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
 
Goal 5: Improving Maternal Health 
•  Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
 
                                                 
19 Is EFA affordable? Estimating the Global Minimum cost of ‘Education for All’  
20 UNICEF did this by: estimating the number of children enrolled in school in 2000; 
estimating the number of children who will be in school in each year between 2000 and 2015 assuming that 
enrolment rates don’t change, based on projected levels of population growth; estimating the number of 
children who will need to be in school each year if enrolment ratios move from current levels to 100% by 
2015, in a linear fashion; calculating the number of new school places that will be needed each year, by 
subtracting the total number of children who will need to be in school to reach 100% by 2015, from the 
baseline scenario; multiplying the number of additional children to be added into school by country 
specific educational costs relative to expenditure levels in the year 2000; and then dividing the additional 
costs by 15 to get average annual costs. It should be noted that we take the lower range of UNICEF’s 
estimates, excluding, for example, the capital costs of building classrooms and the recurrent costs of 
improving educational quality. 
21 It should be noted that these include all forms of educational spending, i.e. including secondary and 
tertiary spending. However, in most countries secondary and tertiary spending are small in comparison 
with primary spending.  
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Goal 6: Combating HIV/AIDS , malaria and other diseases 
•  Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS 
•  Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other related 
diseases. 
 
HIV/AIDS is currently decimating Africa. One in five of all adults in Africa are infected 
by the virus, while 17 million Africans have died from AIDS since the start of the 
epidemic. AIDS has so far left 13 million children orphaned, a figure which will grow to 
40 million by 2010 if no action is taken
22. 
 
Moreover, AIDS is not the only killer. Other diseases such as malaria, TB, childhood 
infectious diseases, maternal and prenatal conditions and micronutrient deficiencies 
abound. Average life expectancy in Africa has fallen since 1980, from 48 to 47 – and in 
individual countries, the fall is much more extreme. Life expectancy in Zambia is now 
only 38 years, down from 50 years in 1980, while Sierra Leone has a life expectancy of 
only 37 years. And even these figures mask the catastrophic impact on children. In 
Africa, 161 children out of every 1,000 children will die before their fifth birthday; in 
Niger, this figure is as high as one in four
23.  
 
Yet, the Global Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has estimated that eight 
million lives could be spared each year if a simple set of health interventions needed to 
meet the MDGs were put in place.  
 
The Commission, which was chaired by Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University, 
was launched by Gro Harlem Bruntland, Director General of the World Health 
Organisation, in 2000. In a recent report into Macroeconomics and Health, it stated that 
‘the vast majority of the excess disease burden [in poor countries] is the result of a 
relatively small number of identifiable conditions, each with a set of existing health 
interventions that can dramatically improve health and reduce the deaths associated with 
these conditions. The problem is that these interventions don’t reach the world’s 
poor. Some of the reasons for this are corruption, mis-management and a weak public 
sector, but in the vast majority of countries, there is a more basic and remediable 
problem.  The poor lack the financial resources to obtain coverage of these 
essential interventions, as do their overnments
24.’  
 
Box 5 shows the key set of health interventions identified by the Commission: 
                                                 
22 Source: ‘Reality Check: The Need for Deeper Debt Cancellation and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS’ 
Drop the Debt Report, April 2001.  
23 Source:  World Development Indicators 2001 
























The Commission also established the costs of scaling up the interventions on a country 
by country basis
25. They recommend that, if the MDGs are to be met, the least developed 
countries will need to spend an average of $41 per capita each year, while other low 
income countries will need to spend $37 per capita. From this, it is easy to calculate the 
total required spending in each of the HIPCs
26.  
 
Our results show that the 39 HIPCs will between them need to spend $20bn each year 
on health if the MDGS are to met – almost three times their 1999 levels of debt service. 
This figure may sound large, but it is only slightly more than the $17bn spent each year in 
Europe and the US on pet food
27. As with education, larger countries will need bigger 
increases in health spending: As Box 6 shows, for example, Ethiopia will need to spend 
almost $2.5bn on health care in order to meet the MDGs, compared to a total 








                                                 
25 The costs were analysed on a country by country basis, taking into account demographic and socio-
economic factors. A model was used to estimate the cost of implementing the interventions, the required 
new investments in training staff and facilities, and the required management and institutional support. The 
costs of the interventions were then adjusted to reflect the requirements for the process of scaling up 
interventions. These include a management cost of 15%; an additional 15% for absorptive capacity given 
the magnitude of resources required; and quality considerations, including a 100% pay increase for staff. 
26 The per capita expenditures were translated into 1999 dollars using a dollar deflator taken from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
27 Source: Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council 
28 Source: Decision Point paper for Ethiopia, World Bank 
Box 5: Required Health Interventions to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals 
 
•  TB Treatment: directly observed short course treatment for smear positive 
patients; directly observed short-course treatments for smear negative patients; 
•  Malaria Prevention: insecticide treated nets; residual indoor spraying 
•  Malaria Treatment: treatment for clinical episodes of malaria 
•  HIV/AIDS Prevention: including youth focused interventions; interventions 
working with sex workers and clients; condom social marketing and distribution; 
workplace interventions; voluntary counselling and testing; prevention of mother-
to-child transmission; treatment for SDTs and mass media campaigns. 
•  HIV/AIDS Care: palliative care; clinical management of opportunistic 
infections; prevention of opportunistic illnesses; and home based care.  
•  HIV/AIDS HAART 
•  Childhood Disease Related Interventions 
•  Vaccinations 
•  Maternity Related Interventions: antenatal care; treatment of complications 
during pregnancy; skilled birth attendance; emergency obstectric care; postpartum 


















The Commission recommends that some of the increase in spending needed should 
come from domestic revenues. But as they note, ‘for the low-income countries, we still 
find a gap between financial means and financial needs, which can be filled only by the 
donor world if there is to be any hope of success in meeting the MDGs
29. But ‘there is 
another method to raise more revenues for health in low income countries: deeper debt 
relief, with the savings allocated to the health sector
30.’ 
 
The need for more debt relief is evident. The Commission Report has showed that vast 
improvements in the lives of millions of people in poor countries are achievable, with an 
increase in expenditure totalling only 0.1% of GDP of the rich donor and creditor 
countries. Yet, despite this overwhelming imperative, the poorest countries are still 
paying debt service of $8bn per year.  
 
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
drinking water  
 
As with education and health care, access to safe water is a basic right. Safe water is vital 
for proper health and hygiene, including the prevention of water borne diseases. 
Distances travelled to fetch water result in a huge loss in time for poor people, 
particularly women and children. Yet, one billion people currently lack safe drinking 
water and almost three billion – half the world’s population – lack adequate 
sanitation. Two million children die each year from water-related diseases. As the Vision 




This is the more so, given that the resources required to ensure universal access to basic 
water and sanitation are comparatively small. World Vision 21, a report produced by 
partners in the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, estimated that  
providing access to safe water and sanitation will only cost $25 per rural dweller – $15 to 
provide access to safe water, $10 for rural sanitation and hygiene promotion – and $75 
per urban dweller, of which $50 is for urban water and $25 for peri-urban sanitation. 
                                                 
29 ibid, page 6 
30 ibid, page 62 
31 Vision 21: A Shared Vision for Hygiene, Sanitation and Water Supply p.1 
Box 6: More Debt, More Death in Ethiopia 
 
Of all the HIPCs, Ethiopia has one of the largest needs in terms of health spending – a 
colossal $2.5bn per year, compared to spending of only $70m in 1999. This amount – 
which totals about 40% of Ethiopia’s GDP – is clearly unaffordable. But prospects for 
reducing the disease burden in Ethiopia, in which 10% of the population have 
HIV/AIDS, life expectancy is only 42, and almost one fifth of children die before their 
fifth birthday, have not been helped by her huge debt burden, which in 1999 stood at 
almost 90% of her GDP.   
 
Ethiopia finally reached decision point under the enhanced HIPC initiative in late 2001, 
following the end of her border conflict with Eritrea in 2000. But even after the projected 
47% reduction in her total debts, her debt service will remain high – at least $74m per 
year for the next 20 years. Prospects for debt sustainability will be further worsened by 
the colossal amounts of new debt which Ethiopia is projected to contract – debts 
amounting to more than 10% of GDP in 2001/02, according to the World Bank. It 
seems that Ethiopia will have more debt, and more death, for many years to come.    30
These are additional to the costs currently borne by households and communities. These 
are one-off costs of providing access to basic water, and do not include the continuing 
costs, for example of operations and maintenance of current water supplies. 
 
In order to meet the MDG of halving the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water, our calculations find that in total, the HIPCs would have to 
spend only $2.4bn per year on water and sanitation
32 – less than Europe spends on 
alcohol over 10 days.  
 
Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers 
 
Slums are defined by the World Bank as ‘neglected parts of cities where housing and 
living conditions are appallingly poor
33.’ Hundreds of millions of the urban poor in 
developing countries currently live in unsafe and unhygienic environments where they 
face multiple threats to their health and security. The tenth millennium development 
target commits the international community to over-turning this unacceptable situation, 
and improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020.  
 
The World Bank have calculated that programmes of upgrading which would provide 
services to all slum areas in all developing countries could be implemented at a cost of 
approximately 0.2% to 0.5% of GDP
34. When the costs of investment in infrastructure, 
land acquisition and necessary institutional support are added, the total comes up to 
around 1% of GDP. Because the MDGs only refer to improving the lives of 100 million 
slum dwellers worldwide, we take the lower of these estimates, and assume that the 
                                                 
32 In order to calculate the level of spending required to meet the target of halving the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, we first took figures of current levels of rural and 
urban water coverage for 2000, from the World Development Indicators 2001. For some countries, 1990 
data had to be used. From this, we estimated the absolute number of people without access to water 
sources, for both rural and urban areas, in 1999. 
We then looked at projected population growth rates for 2015, taken from the World Development 
Indicators 2001. We assumed that the rural and urban growth rates would be the same. This is probably an 
over-simplifying assumption, given that we might expect faster population growth in the urban areas, given 
the gradual trend towards urbanisation. However, this assumption if anything will underestimate the total 
costs, given that costs of provision of water are estimated to be much higher in urban than in rural areas.  
Next, we calculated the target water coverage for 2015, which was assumed to halve the proportion of 
people without access to safe water - in other words, if 60% of the population had access to safe water in 
1999, then the target for 2015 would be 80% - so that the proportion lacking access to water was reduced 
from 40% to 20%. 
Taking into account the population projections for 2015, we then calculated the number of people who 
would have access to water in 2015 if the targets were met. We subtracted the number of people having 
access to water in 2000 from the number in 2015 assuming that the target is met. This gave us the total 
number of people who would have to gain access to water over the period. 
We multiplied this by the cost of accessing water per person, i.e. $25 for each person in rural areas and $75 
for each person in urban areas. This gave us a total cost over 15 years, which we then divided by 15 to give 
an average cost for each year and each country over a 15 year period.  
This was added on to current expenditures on water. Unfortunately, it proved very difficult to gain 
estimates of current levels of expenditure on water, so we had to make an assessment based on regional 
averages of the share of total budgets spent on the water sector (even if these figures are slightly 
misleading, we can assume that there would be scope to reallocate within budgets for those countries 
which spend a lower than average proportion of their budgets on water.) 
We had to exclude some of the very small countries, such as Cape Verde, Comoros, Guyana and Sao 
Tome and Principe from the analysis because of lack of data.  
33 World Bank: Cities Alliance for Cities Without Slums: Action Plan, page 1. 
34 Ibid.   31
HIPCs will need to spend 1% of GDP annually on improving slum conditions. In total, 
this comes to $1.7bn for all the 39 HIPCs considered. 
 
Other Goals and Targets: 
 
Goal 3: Promoting Gender Equality and Empowering Women 
•  Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 
and to all levels of education no later than 2015 
 
Target 9: Integrate the Principles of Sustainable Development into Country   
Policies and Programmes and reverse the loss of Environmental Resources 
 
Providing basic health, education and water to the populations of poor countries is 
clearly vital and should be given preference over debt service payments. But at the same 
time, other dimensions of development – such as promoting gender equality and 
protecting environmental resources, are also needed if development is to be sustainable 
in the long run.  
 
Unfortunately, however, these goals are inherently difficult to cost, and are therefore 
difficult to compare with debt service payments. Promoting gender equality and 
empowering women will, according to the Zedillo report, require a total yearly sum of 
$3bn, but we cannot tell how this will be allocated across the HIPCs and non HIPCs.  
 
It has been estimated that ensuring environmental sustainability will cost about $25bn 
per year alone
35, in addition to the $40-$60bn which the World Bank estimates will be 
needed to meet the other MDGs. While this figure covers all countries, and not just 
HIPCs, it still implies a significant increase over the figures for the other Goals provided 
here  and gives further evidence for the need to cancel poor countries’ debts.  
 
Furthermore, none of the current cost estimates of meeting the MDGs take any account 
of the impacts of climate change, which will set us back from meeting the MDGs and 
require greater costs of mitigation. Some of these impacts, real or projected, are 
summarized below: 
 
•  Expert estimates suggest that global warming related disasters could cost a total of 
$300bn per year within a few decades; 
•  During the 1990s, direct economic losses from natural disasters stood at $63bn per 
year, a five-fold increase since the 1970s. Weather related disasters account for 98% 
of all those affected by natural disasters;  
•  Under global warming, crop yields in Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to fall by 
20%, undermining poverty eradication efforts;  
•  The 1997/8 El Nino storm cost Peru $2.6bn in damaged infrastructure. In 1997, 
Peru received only $490m in aid, but paid out $3.66bn in debt service, of which more 
than half was accounted for by interest payments. 
 
Jubilee Research believes, that it is necessary to take account of the costs associated with 
global warming when considering the current debt problems. As the developed countries 
are mainly responsible for climate change because of their energy-consuming lifestyle, 
                                                 
35 Source: Presentation by Kristaline Georgieva during a meeting on ‘Financing for Sustainable 
Development’, Johannesburg, August 2002   32
they inflict heavy economic burdens on the developing world. Thus, the developed 
countries have amassed a huge ecological debt, which – if calculated in monetary terms – 
might even exceed the debt owed by the developing countries to their rich creditors in a 
few years. This means, that it is in fact the developed countries, which owe money to the 
poor countries, and not the other way round! Therefore, if the costs of climate change 
are accounted for, it becomes clear that the developed world not only has a moral, but a 




A number of counter-arguments against linking debt relief more closely with the MDGs 
have been put forward at various times, in particular by staff at the IMF and World Bank. 
The latest ‘Status of Implementation’ Report on HIPC, for example, reviewed the option 
of providing greater debt cancellation in order to meet the MDGs, but concluded that 
`there are no reliable estimates of the cost of scaling up debt relief to achieve the MDGs' 
and that they would `result in higher overall debt relief to HIPCs and [thus] would clearly 
lead to higher costs for creditors
36.' However, in our view, neither of these points are 
really valid. Firstly, reliable costings of the resource requirements of meeting the MDGs 
are already being worked on by international organisations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP.) Furthermore, the fact that substantial additional 
resources will be needed from creditors should not be used as an excuse for inhibiting 
debate on the financial needs of debtor countries if they are to meet the MDGs.  
 
Various other counter-arguments have also been put forward particularly by staff of the 
IMF and World Bank. These include the following:  
 
`Debt relief cannot be linked to the MDGs because the amount of relief that could 
be provided even with total debt cancellation is not enough to fill the total 
financing gap of $50bn per year.' That is, even total debt cancellation would save 
HIPCs a total of less than $10bn per year, or what they currently pay in debt service. 
Given that the financing gap is $50bn per year, debt relief alone could not provide 
sufficient additional resources.  
 
The observation that poor countries will need further aid, as well as debt cancellation, in 
order to meet the MDGs is obviously true.But not walking a step because you cannot 
walk a mile seems counter-productive – and illogical. Furthermore, the Bank's 
calculations simply do not make sense. For the $50bn resource gap estimated by the 
Bank is for all developing countries, not just the HIPCs. Developing countries in total in 
fact pay very nearly $50bn in debt service each year, according to the Bank's own figures.  
However, it must be recognised that simply cancelling all developing country debt would 
not necessarily channel the extra resources to the countries that need it most.  
 
`New money can be more flexible in resource allocation.' This is an argument that 
has been put forward by World Bank and IMF officials in consultations with civil society, 
but is one that is very hard to substantiate. Debt relief is the probably the most flexible 
form of transfer of resources to poor countries, on the grounds that it provides a pot of 
money that would have otherwise been transferred out of the country. This money is 
then available for spending on education, health or other priority areas needed to meet 
the MDGs. Any aid, whether it is traditional project aid or budget support – where 
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donors contribute directly to the recipient countries budget – brings with it transactions 
costs, such as the time spent negotiating with donors. New aid also inevitably rises and 
falls with the wills of Parliaments in donor countries, making long term planning difficult 
for the poor country government. Debt relief is much more predictable over the long run 
and thus brings substantial benefits to the debtor country.  
 
`New aid can be provided by individual countries, whereas debt relief needs 
multilateral agreement, making it more difficult to achieve.' The centre of this 
argument is the idea of `burden sharing' - namely that when debts are reduced, all 
creditors should take an equal share of the `haircut.' According to this principle, debts 
cannot be reduced without agreement across all countries, while any donor is free to 
provide new aid, regardless of the contributions of other donors. Thus, according to 
political realities, Bank and Fund staff have argued that new aid is a more realistic 
mechanism for providing the financing to meet the MDGs.  
 
But what the Bank and Fund fail to acknowledge is that the principle of proportional 
burden sharing is already being violated within the HIPC initiative, with many of the 
bilateral creditors, including all G7 countries, providing 100% debt cancellation for 
HIPCs – well above the levels they would have to provide under a proportional burden 
sharing approach. Moreover, the Bank and the Fund are themselves violating the 
approach by using bilateral relief to reduce their own contributions, and therefore the 
total amount of relief offered to HIPCs
37.   
 
Furthermore, multilateral pressure for new money – either in the form of aid or debt 
relief – is, if anything, likely to be a good thing. The depressing downward trend in aid 
flows over the 1990s suggests that without multilateral pressure, donors may simply fail 
to cough up. Recent commitments by the EU and US to increase aid during the UN 
Financing for Development process would tend to support this view.  
 
`Market access is more important than debt relief in meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals.' Bank and Fund staff point out that providing duty free access for 
poor-country exports would do more to help meet the MDGs than would further debt 
relief. This may be true, but it does not mean that a debt relief strategy should be 
abandoned altogether. Partly this is again due to political realities: recent moves in the US  
to impose tariffs on steel and increase subsidies for agriculture, as well as refusal of the 
European Union to seriously consider CAP reform, suggest that, if anything, the rich 
world is becoming more protectionist, rather than less. Moreover, debt relief and market 
access are complements, rather than substitutes. Debt relief can provide governments 
with the additional resources they need to invest in the areas which are necessary to 
enable the poor to really benefit from market access and to diversify their export base, 
such as primary education and rural transportation. 
 
`There will be costs in terms of future access to capital markets for countries 
which receive total debt cancellation thus undermining future ability to meet the 
MDGs.' This is an argument which is often used to scupper efforts by poor countries to 
obtain debt relief and economic justice.  The argument is that debt relief today will scare 
off foreign investors tomorrow, undermining countries' ability to attract the foreign 
capital which it is believed they need to grow.  
                                                 
37 For more on this point, see our report ‘Latest HIPC report brings more bad news for poor countries’, 
Jubilee Research at NEF, September 2002, available at 
http://www.jubileeresearch.org/hipc/hipc_news/latest190902.htm   34
 
There are several points that can be made about this argument. Firstly, the reality is that 
the poor countries are receiving very little private foreign investment in any case. Net 
private capital flows to low income countries were only $4.6bn in 2000, or some 2% of 
total private capital flows to developing countries
38. Since 1990, this figure has fallen both 
in absolute terms, and as a proportion of total flows to developing countries.  
 
Second, the example of Russia is illuminating. In 1998 Russia defaulted, and by so doing 
regained the economic initiative needed to return the country to creditworthiness. The 
return of investors to Russia is an indication that it is not debt write-off as such that 
deters investors, but the debt overhang.  
 
Furthermore there are reasons to believe that debt relief resources, if assigned to human 
development will actually promote private capital flows. The major reason for the limited 
volume of capital flows to poorer developing countries is lack of infrastructure, skills and 
capacity. Investors are far more likely to go to countries with a good transport 
infrastructure, an educated population and a reliable power supply. Meeting the MDGs 
would go a long way towards guaranteeing these conditions.  
 
 
7.  A DEBT RELIEF FOR MDGS PROGRAMME  
 
In this section we outline our proposals for a staged programme for achieving 
sustainable debt cancellation for the poorest countries. Such a programme of debt 
cancellation would have to be linked to the achievement of individual MDGs country-
by-country. Integrating debt cancellation targets with MDG targets requires a broader, 
more co-operative exercise than the one we undertake here – and we look forward to 
further joint work with UNDP staff on this programme. Nevertheless, our assessment of 
the amounts of debt cancellation needed (outlined in the preceding sections and reports) 
will be evidence in support of any debt cancellation programme. Under the 
programme/process outlined below, once agreement has been reached on the amount of 
debt re-structuring needed, then debt cancellation should be swift. The process in each 
individual country, could, we suggest, take from 3 months to 2 years.  It will all depend 
on the reliability of data and the settlement of disputes over the accuracy and legitimacy 
of claims.  Debt Relief International, a sister organisation, already does considerable 
work in building capacity in debt portfolio management in the poorest countries and we 
would expect them to be part of this process.   
 
First, a word about language.  “Debt relief” is an euphemism used by HIPC creditors to 
describe what is often nothing more than debt-rescheduling.  In some cases under the 
HIPC initiative, “debt relief” has led to increased annual debt repayments, as, in return for 
becoming “good debtors”, sovereign governments have been rewarded with the promise 
of future stock-of-debt cancellation. As a result of ‘debt relief” therefore, some countries 
have had fewer current resources to devote to development; many more have had only 
marginal “relief”.  To achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 in the 
poorest, most indebted countries, we at Jubilee Research believe that it is vital, in most 
of the HIPC cases that immediate stock of debt cancellation is offered, to reduce current debt 
repayments. This was in fact the spirit of the original HIPC initiative as devised by the 
World Bank. IMF intervention in the design of HIPC ensured that debt cancellation was 
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often delayed by up to 7 years – as a way of disciplining debtors; and increasing transfers 
to creditors through so-called IMF “structural adjustment” programmes. The Fund had 
not considered equivalent measures for disciplining creditors, until it backed the idea of a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in November 2001.  
 
As earlier sections of this report have amply demonstrated, since the 1982 Mexican debt 
default, attempts by creditors to single-handedly resolve sovereign debt crises have failed 
miserably.  The reason for this has a lot to do with creditors organised around and within 
the IMF refusing to recognise the reality of unpayable and uncollectable debts.  Another 
reason is the structural injustice of creditors playing the role of plaintiff, judge and jury in 
the court of international debt and finance.  
 
It has not always been thus. The most striking example of creditors accepting losses, 
already referred to in previous sections, is that of the treatment of Germany in 1953, 
under the remarkable and relatively unknown London Agreement.
39 This agreement was 
forged after an independent central banker was appointed by the Allies to rule on 
Germany’s debt sustainability – and to propose levels of debt repayments that would 
allow the German people and their economy to recover from the destruction of war.  
 
Furthermore, as Raffer has shown, some 19
th century creditors showed considerable 
wisdom in restoring debtor economies to economic health before extracting further 
assets from these sovereigns in the form of debt repayments. Over the last few decades, 
creditors organised within and around the IMF have failed dismally to restore debtor 
nations (particularly those in Africa) to economic health – thereby improving their 
overall human development, their creditworthiness and their ability to repay debts.  
 
So the programme we propose for restoring poor countries to a position where their 
debt is sustainable and supports achievement of the MDGs, would be radically different 
from the current programme for “debt relief”.  
 
Principles underlying the Debt Restructuring for MDGs programme:  
 
The following principles, based on those outlined in our report: “Jubilee Framework for 
international insolvency” should underpin any programme for cancelling unpayable and 
uncollectable debts and transferring resources to human development goals. The 
principles are based on the early proposal for a sovereign debtor insolvency framework 
first outlined by Prof. Kunibert Raffer of the University of Vienna in 1987. His proposal 
is based in turn, on Chapter 9 of the US legal code, which provides for the insolvency of 
governmental, as opposed to commercial organisations
40. (Most other proposals, e.g. 
those of Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, are based on Chapter 11 as the model).  
 
According to US legal principles, any governmental debt re-structuring process must:  
 
•  be based on principles that underpin the rule of law;  
•  enforce a fundamental principle of the rule of law: that no party can act as judge 
or jury in the settlement of their own claims;  
                                                 
39  For further information on the London Agreement see the website of the German debt cancellation 
campaign – Erlassjahr, at www. erlassjahr.org  
40 Please refer to Prof. Raffer’s website for copies and titles of his publications: 
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•  be based on reason – not dominance, self-interest and coercion;  
•  be fair to both the debtor and creditors; 
•  prevent unequal treatment of different classes of creditors (ie official vs 
commercial creditors);  
•  be open, transparent and accountable to the citizens and taxpayers of the debtor 
community, as well as to creditors. This is after all public, not private debt;  
•  be overseen and resolved by a body independent of both the creditors and 
debtor; 
•  ensure that sustainability of the (sovereign nation’s) debt is determined, on a 
case-by-case basis, through a process of open, independent and considered 
debate, deliberation and consultation; 
•  ensure that the costs of restructuring do not fall on either taxpayers or 
governmental employees – who should have a right to comment on, and even 
veto, the final “composition plan”.  
 
We argue that the following organisational steps are necessary, at an international level, 
to ensure the achievement of debt cancellation or debt re-structuring in order to free up 
resources for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.  
 
First, we propose that the process should be an ad-hoc, case-by-case process for resolving 
the sovereign’s debt crisis and determining debt sustainability, similar to other 
international ad-hoc processes for resolving disputes (e.g. those overseen by the 
International Chamber of Commerce for the resolution of disputes between TNCs and 
sovereign governments, and the UN’s Commission on Internal Trade Law 
(UNCTRAC)). Such ad-hoc procedures should be overseen by the SG of the UN, could 
be put in place immediately and could take place simultaneously across a range of debtor 
nations.  
 
Second, under the ad-hoc process, an independent panel or court should rule on the 
sovereign debtor’s petition (see below) for protection from creditors, oversee the 
proceedings, ensure equitable burden sharing amongst all creditors, and will be charged 
with a) guaranteeing the human rights of the people of the sovereign debtor nation and 
b) enforcing the decisions of the court.  
 
Third, we propose that sovereign debtors should have an unconditional right to petition 
for ‘protection from creditors’, and to set up an independent panel – so that debt 
sustainability can be realistically assessed; debts cancelled and resources conserved for 
achieving the MDGs.  Such a petition should be based on an assessment by the 
sovereign debtor that public debt repayments are made at a cost to the human rights or 
dignity of the people of that country – or to the government’s ability to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals.  This petition could initially be presented to the 
Secretary General of the UN.  It must however, subsequently be heard, and agreed, by 
the independent panel or court.  
 
Fourth, we propose that the Secretary General of the UN should oversee the ad-hoc 
process of debt restructuring, ensuring that an independent panel is appointed in all the 
countries that petition for the right to resolve their debt crisis. He should ensure that the 
panel upholds the human rights of the citizens of the debtor nation, as well as respecting 
the rights of foreign and domestic creditors. The SG’s role will be to ensure that the   37
process is transparent, independent and fair, by monitoring progress and making these 
reports public, particularly in the debtor nation itself.  
 
The SG’s first task would be to ensure that both the creditors and debtor nominate equal 
numbers of representatives to the ad-hoc panel; and that these two sets of 
representatives nominate, in turn, a third party to act as judge/chairperson of the panel. 
Appropriate nominees could include ex-central bankers or finance ministers with 
experience of sovereign debt management.  
 
A vital task for the SG will be to ensure a central role for the UN in determining the 
country’s debt sustainability.  The independent panel’s decision on what level of debt 
repayments are sustainable and in line with the resources needed to achieve the MDGs – 
will be one of its central functions. Determining the level of debt sustainability will 
effectively determine the amount of debt that needs to be cancelled to return the 
sovereign to viability.  We suggest that evidence submitted by UN institutions, based on 
their experience of working in and with these nations, will be vital in assisting the panel, 
and supplementing evidence from both government and civil society, in order to arrive at 
a rational and fair assessment of the sovereign’s capacity to pay. Such an assessment 
should not put at risk the human rights of its citizens or its ability to achieve the MDGs.   
 
The SG will have a duty to ensure that relevant experts from  
 
a)  international agencies (e.g. UNDP: UNICEF; ILO and the WHO); 
b)  local and international civil society – including parliamentarians; NGOs; trades 
unionists and faith institutions; 
c)  ministers and officials of the debtor government; and   
d)  representatives of creditors (IMF, World Bank; Paris Club; London Club) – all 
submit appropriate and relevant evidence to each individual panel; and are given 
an opportunity to argue and substantiate their evidence.    
 
Fifth, when a sovereign debtor declares an inability to service debts and seeks a standstill 
on debt repayments – then that sovereign will inevitably need a) to impose capital 
controls temporarily and b) obtain interim finance for the period of the re-organisation 
of its debts. Funding can be obtained from two sources: public creditors or private 
creditors. In our view only public creditors can provide sufficient working capital for the 
temporary period during which the debt crisis is being resolved. The IMF, as a 
multilateral creditor, is the most appropriate institution to provide such finance, and by 
doing so would help promote equilibrium during the period of debt restructuring. We 
accept that this interim finance should be granted seniority in repayment. However we 
argue that the conditions for the repayment of this interim finance should be determined 
by the independent court or panel; not by the IMF. The court should in turn, protect the 
seniority of the repayments of this interim finance to the IMF.  
 
Conditionality should be determined by the court in a transparent and participative 
manner. Experience of the Ugandan Poverty Action Fund shows that transparent, 
accountable forms of conditionality, undertaken in the full glare of the media, with the 
active support of civil society in that country; and directed at poverty reduction, are the 
best way of deepening democratic involvement in government financial decision-making. 
This democratic accountability in turn, discourages the rampant corruption associated 
with international lending and borrowing. Such transparent, accountable processes are 
therefore the most effective way of disciplining sovereign debtors benefiting from debt   38
relief; ensuring that funds from debt cancellation are not squandered; and preventing 
future reckless borrowing.  
 
Sixth:  All the sovereign’s publicly guaranteed debts – both domestic and foreign - 
should be subject to the restructuring process. This must include debts owed to local 
financial institutions; the private sector; the IMF (other than the interim finance 
mentioned above); the World Bank and the Paris Club.  
 
Seventh: For the duration of the debt restructuring process, the sovereign will have to 
temporarily reassert immunity from prosecution by creditors. This immunity should be 
recognised and respected by the two jurisdictions in which private bondholders/creditors 
are mainly registered – London and New York. After the debt restructuring process the 
sovereign could once again waive immunity. 
 
The responsibilities of the panel/court:   
 
a)  Determining whether sovereign debts were legally and properly contracted. All claims 
would have to be verified loan-by-loan, checking that all outstanding claims were 
legitimately contracted by the sovereign debtor and her creditors. Such a process would 
e.g. dismiss some of the debts contracted illegally and fraudulently by Argentina’s military 
during the period of 1976- 1983 – debts for which no formal records remain.  
 
b) Involving civil society in this process. The debate about the outstanding portfolio of 
debts should be a public debate, with parliaments, the media and NGOs scrutinising 
outstanding debts, to ascertain whether they were properly contracted within the formal 
procedures of the state. (In some countries, notably Brazil, Nigeria and Tanzania civil 
society actors have already under taken public audits of outstanding debts – with a view 
to exposing the odious and illegitimate nature of much of the debt).  
 
c) Checking whether debts have been retroactively ‘nationalised’. In many countries, 
governments have been forced by creditor cartels like the Paris Club to retroactively 
assume losses from private lending – initially undertaken without any government 
guarantees or involvement. In Argentina many multinational companies, with branches 
in Buenos Aires, arranged for their foreign debts to be nationalised during the time of 
the military regime
41. The IMF and World Bank have turned a blind eye to such dubious 
legal practices. These ‘nationalised’ private debts must be declared null and void.  
 
d) Ensuring symmetrical treatment of creditors: There is no reason why any particular 
class of creditors, and in particular public creditors like the IMF and World Bank, should 
be given preferential treatment in an insolvency process. The striking contrast between 
free-market recommendations made by IFIs and their own protection from market 
forces, must be abolished. Symmetrical treatment of creditors is more than justified. 
 
e) Capital Flight. The debtor government, with the support of the court, will have to take 
measures to prevent rich nationals from exporting their assets via the Central Bank, in 
the form of ‘capital flight’. In a radical departure from previous policy, and in a major 
concession, the IMF has indicated that the ‘the imposition of exchange controls for a 
temporary period of time’ would be necessary
42. We agree. Furthermore, we argue that an 
international Chapter 9 framework should provide for the possibility of overruling 
                                                 
41 See ‘It takes two to Tango’ by Jubilee Plus (the former name for Jubilee Research.)  
42 Speech by Ms Anne Krueger, 26 November 2001 page 6, para 1.   39
banking secrecy, if suspicion exists that money was obtained in the first place by criminal 
activities, such as corruption, theft or embezzlement.  
 
Civil society, will again, at this stage, play a crucial role in exposing such criminal 
activities in to the members of the court.  
 
f) Protecting the human rights of citizens of the sovereign debtor; and the resources 
needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It is essential that schemes to 
protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens of the debtor nation should be part 
and parcel of every debt workout plan. In an analogy with the protection granted to the 
population of an indebted municipality by Chapter 9, the money to service a country's 
debt can not, and must not be raised by destroying basic social services, fundamental to 
the defence of human rights. Subsidies and transfers necessary to guarantee these 
minimum rights for the poor, must be defended and maintained. Funds for sustainable 
economic recovery, and for the achievement of the MDGs, must be set aside in e.g a 
Poverty Action Fund, and monitored by civil society.  
 
Civil society will have a crucial role to play during these sessions of the independent 
arbitration court, to defend these human rights. Any international treaty devised to 
facilitate international insolvency should have these rights enshrined within it.  
 
g) Mandating the final debt workout – or ‘composition plan’. The court would have to 
bind all creditors, and the debtor, to a debt reduction agreement which is ‘fair, equitable 
and feasible’; in which losses would be shared; and the debtor nations’ human rights and 
achievement of the MDGs would be given precedence over bona fide claims.  
 
h) Civil society’s role in shaping the final debt workout plan. As in Chapter 9 
proceedings, representatives of government employees and taxpayers of the sovereign 
debtor nation should be given the right to comment on the soundness of the final plan 
binding the government and her creditors; and to object to the final debt workout. This 
is a right that will have to be fought for, as independent panels are established, and their 




It is clear that achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is heavily dependent 
both on substantial debt cancellation and the provision of additional resources to 
indebted nations. It is also clear that the necessary debt cancellation cannot be achieved 
under current creditor-dominated procedures. In this report we have sought to outline 
the extent of the debt crisis; the inadequacy of current initiatives – and a constructive 
way forward for achieving the debt cancellation necessary to achievement of the MDGs.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 